N.R. Jenzen-Jones

I am currently traveling on business, but have excerpted some comments from the US Department of State’s Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Wendy Sherman, on the current status of US policy towards Iran. There were several interesting sections, but the discussion of US outreach targeting Iranian citizens I found particularly interesting.

Coupled with our concerns about human rights are our concerns about the well-being of the Iranian people. Every day, we hear from the Iranian people directly through our public diplomacy programs and Farsi-language social media platforms. The Virtual Embassy Tehran, launched in December 2011, has over 2 million hits and our Farsi-language Facebook, Twitter, Google+, and YouTube channel have also been enormously successful. The 170 videos on our YouTube channel have more than 1 million views and our Facebook page has over 120,000 fans, 60 percent of whom are inside of Iran and who access our sites even though the Iranian regime blocks the site.

What we see through our interactions is that the Iranian people are being detrimentally affected by the misplaced priorities, corruption and mismanagement of their government. Instead of meeting the needs of its own people, the Iranian regime has chosen to spend enormous amounts of its money and resources to support the Asad regime as well as its militant proxies around the world, and to pursue the development of weapons of mass destruction. Instead of investing in its people, Iran continues to restrain their vast potential through censorship, oppression, and severe limitations on their social, political and even academic freedoms.

As the President and the Secretary have said, in the United States our own communities have been enhanced by the contributions of Iranian Americans. We know that the Iranian people come from a great civilization whose accomplishments have earned the respect of the world. That is why in his 2013 Nowruz message, the President emphasized that there is no good reason for Iranians to be denied the opportunities enjoyed by people in other countries.

Iranians deserve the same freedoms and rights as people everywhere and all nations would benefit from the talents and creativity of the Iranian people, especially its youth. It is a shame that much of the world realizes this and the Iranian government has yet to do so.

…

In sum, Iranians deserve better. Their government has chosen to isolate them, stunt their economic growth, repress their ability to speak freely, and connect the people of Iran with the most heinous acts of terrorism and regional adventurism. Iran’s government can choose to end these policies at any time and put their people’s well being first.

As the President said, we have no illusions about the difficulty of overcoming decades of mistrust. It will take a serious and sustained effort to resolve the many differences between Iran and the United States. We do not expect to always agree, but rather for Iran to be an honest and responsible member of the international community, a community where members honor their commitments and keep their word or pay the price.

Image copyright: International Herald Tribune

Recently, both sides involved in the fighting in Syria have accused the other of chemical weapons (CW) use. Remnants of similar items were found in two alleged chemical attacks in Saraqeb, Idlib and Sheikh Maqsoud, Aleppo. Eliot Higgins has gone into a little more detail on the items in question. Whilst the munitions can not be conclusively identified, they do not appear to match any known CW delivery devices, including known smaller devices intended for special operations. Less than an hour ago, Jeffry Ruigendijk published a series of photos on his website, showing a fighter from the Al-Nusra Front (an Al Qaeda-associated rebel group in Syria) with what appears to be one of the grenades in question.

Whilst not matching any CW delivery devices known to me or to the CW specialists I spoke with, the munitions do appear quite similar to those produced by the Indian Border Security Force’s Tear Smoke Unit (TSU), at their plant in Tekanpur, Madhya Pradesh. Several of their production items appear to share  physical similarities with the unidentified grenade, but the closest visual  match is their ‘Tear Smoke Chilli Grenade’, seen below. This grenade contains a combination of CS gas ( 2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile) and ‘synthetic chilli’ (likely a synthetic capsaicin, such as nonivamide) – both common riot control agents.

Whilst this is certainly not an exact visual match, it may point to similarities present in other (perhaps older or newer) products which TSU manufactures, or copies, variants, or similar munitions produced by other countries. The white plastic-cased grenade in the image at top does not feature any discernible markings, which is possibly consistent with the removal of the adhesive labels seen on TSU’s products. The safety lever (AKA ‘fly-off lever’ or ‘spoon’) appears to be of similar design, although there appear to be differences in the fuze design. This Indian news article notes that Turkey purchased 10,025 munitions from TSU in 2007, which may indicate a possible avenue of supply, particularly if the grenades were in the hands of rebel forces, as the image at top appears to indicate.

Of course, this grenade remains unidentified, and we cannot conclusively rule out the use of CW, but it seems increasingly less likely that chemical weapons were used in the two attacks in question.

Update 09/05/2013: Benjamin Hiller has forwarded me a link to the Nanxing Chemical General factory in China, who also offer a squat, plastic-cased riot control grenade. This product appears to combine the effects of a flashbang grenade with CS gas. Whilst, again, this is certainly not an ID, it does show similar products being produced in China, who are known to have supplied numerous arms and munitions to Syria.

Update 09/05/2013 (0700 GMT): Along with TSU, I also got in touch with another Indian company manufacturing less-lethal munitions. Premier Explosives Limited (PEL), based in Secunderabad, Andhra Pradesh, describe themselves as “the only pvt. Sector Co, which produces TEAR GAS SHELL”. Their device, pictured below, also bears physical resemblance to the grenade in question, as well as to the TSU products. PEL‘s President -Business Development emailed me, to confirm the munitions seen in Syria were not produced by their factory:

“The grenade shown in the photograph looks similar to the one that is produced by us, however the one shown in the photograph is not ours.”

He noted that their OC-based munitions are provided to the Indian Army and internal security forces in India, although the devices are available for export. 

My thanks to Mike Weber, Eliot Higgins, Benjamin Hiller, as well as a CW specialist who wishes to remain unnamed. A special hat tip is due to Aris Roussinos, who pointed us all in the direction of TSU. 

I have emailed the BSF, and the TSU specifically, and asked them for assistance in identifying these munitions and any possible diversion. This post will be updated to reflect their reply, if any.
Should anyone recognise the grenade pictured, or have any other suggestions for identification, please get in touch.

Following are two more safety sheets I produced for the RRMA, as part of a package provided to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to support their ongoing efforts in Syria. The content of these  is drawn largely from previous posts here. There are one-sheets for the ZAB-2.5 incendiary and Sakr Type B submunitions, as well as a general sheet (above) outlining the four different submunitions identified at the time of publication. We have since observed the presence of ShOAB-0.5 submunitions as well, which I will discuss briefly below.

ZAB-2.5 incendiary submunitions one-sheet, detailing the three variants and their respective compositions. Remember, attempting to extinguish these submunitions may be extremely hazardous.

Sakr Type B submunitions one-sheet. Remember, these submunitions can be particularly dangerous due to their fuzing and detonation method. Even the wind can cause these type of munitions to detonate unexpectedly. 

ShOAB-0.5 submunitions have also been identified in Syria in recent weeks. ‘ShOAB’ stands for Sharikovaya Oskolochnaya Aviatsionnaya Bomba, or ‘spherical fragmentation aircraft bomb’, and describes the fragmentation (anti-personnel) effect of these submunitions. The ShOAB-0.5 is loaded into the RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5 cargo bomb, which contains a nominal 565 submunitions (+/- 5 pieces). Assembled, these bombs are 1950mm long, and weigh 334kg.  It should be noted that the diagram above shows a model without the aerodynamic fairing (nose cone). The bomb contains a central bursting charge for dispersing its payload. The ShOAB-0.5 bomblets themselves are derived from the US BLU-26 (and similar) series submunitions, and weigh approximately 417g each. They are 60mm diameter spheres containing approximately 304 steel balls which act as shrapnel when dispersed by the 70g of TG-30 explosive compound (30% TNT, 70% RDX) contained within the cast steel shell.

Update 07/05/2013: Impartial Bias over at MP.net sent me the following video, showing several ShOAB-0.5 subs in Syria.

Remember, submunitions are particularly dangerous. As always, if you see any UXO, remember the ‘ARMS’ acronym:

This screenshot, a frame taken from the YouTube video seen below, shows a fighter of the Mouvement pour le Tawhîd et du Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) in Mali holding a 9K32 or 9K32M Man Portable Air Defence System (MANPADS). From the blurry video it is difficult to determine whether this is a 9K32 (NATO reproting name: SA-7a) or 9K32M (SA-7b) system, both produced in the former Soviet Union, or a foreign variant. It is clear, however, that both the gripstock and Battery Coolant Unit (BCU) are present. MUJAO are associated with Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine, and Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s brigade, and are listed on the United Nations Al-Qaida Sanctions List.

The rest of the video contains little of interest in terms of materiel, with MUJOA fighters seen armed with a typical assortment of AK-pattern assault rifles (including at least two Chinese Type 56-2 rifles), DShKM heavy machine guns, and so on. The video also shows MUJAO fighters using a handful of Soviet-era armoured vehicles, including a BRDM-2 and a BTR-60, both equipped with 14.5×114 KPVT heavy machine guns

My thanks to Aris Roussinos for spotting this video. 

It’s that time of year again! Twitter Fight Club kicks off for 2013 and, as with last year’s tournament, I will be one of several judges trying to decipher and adjudicate the coming virtual fracas. For the uninitiated, all the information you need can be found here. My judging criteria will be the same as I used last year, as follows:

1. Quality of arguments – First and foremost, the quality of arguments will hold the highest priority, with an emphasis on original thought, clear logic, and the significance of what is tweeted.
2. Depth of knowledge – Provision of concise supporting material, addressing counter-arguments and alternative points of view, and demonstrating general depth and breadth of subject matter understanding.
3. Engagement – Interaction with followers, other #TFC12 competitors, judges, and - particularly - critics of your tweets/arguments. Audience participation encouraged!
4. Humour & style – Getting your message across in a way that captures attention and suits the medium. Points for snark, wit, fine prose, clever ‘hooks’, elegance/endearing brashness of style, or any combination therein.

I will not be taking into account the number of followers a competitor has. Whilst I appreciate the impact of followers on the ability to disseminate your arguments and opinions,  the ‘public poll’ portion of TFC accounts for this. No doubt competitors will attempt flattery, bribery, and so on… I’m partial to peaty Scotch, fine cigars, and cartridge cases from conflict zones.

The hashtag for relevant tweets is ‘#TFC13′. I encourage competitors to use the same where required. You can find me on Twitter here.

Good luck!

Anza Mk-II Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) have been observed in Libya. A source working with an NGO in Libya, who wishes to remain anonymous, sent me the images featured in this piece. These images were taken in 2011 at arms depots wrested from government control by rebel forces. The Anza Mk-II, developed at the Dr A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories in Kahuta, is a derivative of the Chinese QW-1, first developed in the early 1990s. It was introduced to Pakistan’s armed forces in 1994, and features a slant range of approximately 5km, a maximum engagement altitude of around 4km, and a missile speed of approximately 600m/s. The Anza Mk-II missile features a solid-fuel booster and solid-fuel sustainer motor, weighs 10.68kg, and contains around 550g of High Explosive (HE).

The Anza Mk-II constitutes a greater threat than the SA-7b systems that make up the bulk of MANPADS identified in Libya. Nonetheless, it poses only a moderate danger to modern fighter aircraft. How these missiles ended up in Libya is not clear, with Malaysia being the only known export customer of the system. Anza Mk-I missiles have, however, been recovered by the Indian military from militants in Kashmir.

Anza Mk-II missile launch tubes are seen alongside 9K32M (SA-7b) and 9K338 (SA-24) tubes in a captured arms depot. 

The Federation of American Scientists has some more information, here. 

By N.R. Jenzen-Jones

Royal Air Force (RAF) Regiment troops, possibly based out of Honington or Wittering, have been deployed to Bamako as a force protection (FP) element for RAF operations in support of the French intervention in Mali. France’s Opération Serval is being supported by two RAF C-17ER transport planes, operated by No. 99 Squadron from RAF Brize Norton. These aircraft are to ferry French armoured vehicles from the Évreux-Fauville Air Base in France, to Bamako.

Whilst the British government has claimed there will be ‘no UK boots on the ground’, that is not strictly true. In this video, RAF Regiment FP elements can be seen at Bamako Airport with a range of field kit, small arms, and other equipment. The RAF tactical recognition flash and RAF Regiment ‘mudguard’ badges can be clearly seen (see examples below). French VAB (Véhicule de l’Avant Blindé) series armoured personnel carriers are unloaded from the C-17ER. RAF regiment gunners fought alongside US Marines during the insurgent attack on Camp Bastion in Afghanistan, last September. The attack left two US Marines of Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMA-211) dead, 6 AV-8B Harrier II ground attack aircraft destroyed, and two more damaged. Members of No. 5 RAF Regiment Force Protection Wing and elements 2/10 Battalion US Marines then fought to regain control of the airfield, capturing one insurgent, and killing fourteen others.

The deployment of limited FP assets as seen in Bamako is standard procedure, and certainly does not constitute a British commitment to combat operations in Mali. Nevertheless, the British government has been less than transparent about these measures. In a 14 January sitting of the House of Commons, Bob Stewart (Conservative Member for Beckenham) asked:

“The House totally understands that no combat troops will be deployed, yet technical personnel will be sent to Bamako airfield to service the large aircraft that will presumably bring in equipment such as tanks. When those aircraft land, will those technical personnel include force protection personnel, possibly including personnel from the RAF Regiment, who are actually soldiers?”

Mark Simmonds, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, responded:

“I thank my hon. Friend for his question. The capital of Mali is pronounced “Bam-ack-co”. Just to clarify the matter, there are currently no plans for NATO to be involved in Mali. The EU has drawn up a mission comprising 400 men, about 250 of whom will be force protection, and they are due to deploy later in the year. My hon. Friend asked a specific question about the number of military personnel who will be there to operate and to defend, if necessary, the aircraft when they are in Bamako. I will have to let him know about that.”

It seems strange that the British government would not be as open and transparent as possible with regards to the FP measures being undertaken to secure RAF assets in Mali. One would think the British public would be reassured to know that the appropriate security elements are in place, whether that technically means combat troops on the ground, or not.

My thanks to Aris Roussinos for his assistance with this piece.
RAF Regiment recognition flash (credit: Wikimedia) and ‘mudguard’ (credit).
RAF Regiment gunners landing in Bamako. Credit: ITN Source.

RAF Regiment gunners, aboard a RAF C-17ER, in front of a French VAB SAN (armoured ambulance variant). Credit: AFP.

Aris has also pointed out this image, which appears to show Royal Air Force Police (with red MP flash) in Bamako. 

Recently, Sakr 122mm cargo rockets and their submunitions have been observed within Syria. This family of 122mm rockets is designed for use with the Russian BM-21 multiple rocket launcher (the so-called ‘Grad’, or ‘hail’) and other 122mm systems such as the Chinese Type 81 SPRL and Egyptian RL-21 and RC-21 launch vehicles. These surface-to-surface multiple rocket launcher systems are not designed for precise fires, but instead target wide areas; this effect is, of course, even more pronounced when firing submunition-dispensing rockets from these systems. Despite multiple reports to the contrary, these munitions are not Iranian, but were produced in Egypt at the Sakr Factory for Development Industries, a subsidiary of the Egyptian Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI). The AOI logo can be seen very clearly on the rocket in the video below, and the full name along with ‘Sakr Factory’ can be seen printed on the rockets in Arabic in the images at the bottom of this article.

Sakr 122mm rockets are produced with high explosive (HE), leaflet, or submunition payloads. It is also believed that mine-dispensing and illumination varieties have been manufactured. Sakr 122mm rockets have been produced in four lengths, with designations of Sakr-10, Sakr-18, Sakr-36, and Sakr-45, for their approximate ranges. In reality, the maximum range varies depending on the payload of the rocket. Cargo rockets are produced in the -18, -36, and -45 varieties, with effective ranges of 17, 31, and 42 kilometres, respectively. The Sakr-10 and Sakr-18 models feature ‘S-form’ folding fins (as seen on the Soviet/Russian 9M22U and other 122mm rockets), whilst the Sakr-36 and Sakr-45 feature straight fins, as seen in the video above. Whilst the video description claims there were ‘over 100 bomb[lets]’, this is unlikely. Sakr-18 and Sakr-45 rockets contain 72 submunitions each, whilst Sakr-36 rockets contain 98. A mechanical time fuze causes the submunitions to eject from the carrier rocket (believed to occur at approximately 700m above ground, in the case of the Sakr series rockets). The fuze and rocket nose cone can be seen in the image below (credit).  

Whilst information on the submunitions themselves is scarce, it appears that early rockets were loaded with Soviet and Chinese submunitions, including Chinese Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM) derived from US designs. Later rockets, including those in current production, are loaded with copies of the US M77 submunition; these are probably Egyptian-produced copies, although some may have been manufactured in China. Some western sources refer to this later submunition as an ‘M42D’, though it is unclear where this designation originates (other than the obvious allusion to the US M42 submunition). It is not clear whether this is an internal designation, or a term applied by an observer at a later date. The submunitions observed appear to be copies of the US M77 submunition, rather than the M42, and feature the wider ribbon necessary to arm the munition when released from a cargo rocket. The bomblets pictures are one of two confirmed submunitions known to be used with Sakr 122mm rockets, and are sometimes referred to simply as the ‘Sakr Type B’ submunition. Both the ‘Type A’ and ‘Type B’ appear to be copies of the US M77.

M77 submunitions, and the related M42 and M46, have been widely copied throughout the globe. Nonetheless, they all operate in a similar basic fashion, as follows: Once the submunitions are ejected from the carrier the ribbon unfurls in the airstream. This ribbon flutters as it falls, causing motion that unscrews a ‘screw’ (threaded firing pin) it is attached to. Once unscrewed, a spring-loaded detonator slide safety is released to the side of the munition, leaving the screw directly above the detonator. Impact inertia drives the screw into the detonator upon impact. If the submunition impacts on an angle, or has its fall broken by foliage or similar, it may fail to detonate. This leaves the screw perilously close to the detonator, and any wind can cause the ribbon to move the screw back and forth across the face of the detonator. Submunitions found in such a state are extremely dangerous. One EOD specialist who I spoke with had the following to say:

I worked for several years cleaning up after firings of the US MLRS with the M77; we had the utmost respect for the sensitivity of the detonator. If the wind reached 6 knots at ground level we would depart the range area, any movement of the ribbon on dud munitions could potentially cause detonation. Normally we could not just quit for the day, so we would retreat to our safe zone to play cards and wait to see if the wind died down. On numerous occasions while waiting we would have detonations within the area from wind disturbance.

The submunitions seen in the video above appear, in most cases, to have failed to arm. However, towards the end of the video a submunition with an armed fuze can be seen (circled in image below). This is extremely dangerous to move, handle, or approach.

Remember, all unexploded munitions – especially submunitions such as these – are dangerous. You can visit RRMA for more information. As always, if you see any UXO, remember the ‘ARMS’ acronym:

•AVOID the area
•RECORD all relevant information from a safe distance
•MARK the area to warn others
•SEEK assistance from the relevant authorities  

Should any readers have further information on the submunitions used with Sakr 122mm rockets, or new photos or footage of such rockets or submunitions, please get in touch. My thanks to Jeff Osborne, Michael Weber, Peter White, Neil Marshall, and Travis Owen for their assistance with this piece. 

Additional Material

This promotional video from AOI/Sakr FDI is available on my YouTube Channel:

This series of photos was taken by Nicole Tung, a professional photographer, in Jebel al-Zawiyah. Note the markings, submunition characteristics, and fragmentation matrix.

This piece is adapted from an article appearing in Volume 5, Number 1 of the Small Arms Defence Journal.

In September 2012, I had the opportunity to visit Lithgow (New South Wales, Australia) at the invitation of Thales Australia in order to conduct a Test and Evaluation (T&E) of their Enhanced F88 Assault Rifle. This weapon is being developed for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) under the Land 125 Phase 3C program. Pending the results of Department of Defence testing, this rifle will be in the early stages of manufacturing in 2014. A version of the EF88, with several minor differences, is being marketed globally by Thales as the F90, drawing directly on the Australian small arms experience. The EF88 is the latest iteration of the long-serving F88 Austeyr; this updated weapon has been designed and produced more than 20 years after the first F88 rifles entered service in Australia, and over 35 years since the Steyr AUG on which it is based was first designed in Austria. Fundamentally, the EF88 remains much the same as its predecessors: a bullpup-configuration selective fire weapon, chambered for the 5.56x45mm NATO cartridge, short-stroke piston operated and firing from a closed bolt.

Despite core similarities, the EF88 features a number of improvements designed to make the weapon more user-friendly and more combat effective. Many of these changes were inspired by a combination of operational user input and Defence specifications, whilst others were entirely Thales Australia’s own concepts.  In fact, Thales Australia made a corporate decision to exceed the specifications laid out by Defence in Land 125, and have upgraded their operations at Lithgow from ‘build-to-print’ manufacturing to encompass a true Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) capability.

A lot of the experience that made this possible was gained during the F88SA2 program. As some readers may be aware, the F88SA2 has actually been made in two different series. The F88SA2 first saw service in 2009 and sported a two-tone colour change, a longer upper rail, and a bespoke side bracket to allow the fitting of a Night Aiming Device (NAD) or flashlight. The 2009 series experienced a technical issue, occasionally failing to fully lock with a full magazine after being manually cocked. Many users had taken to only loading 28 or 29 cartridges in each magazine as a way of combating this issue. In 2010, Thales made a series of reliability enhancements to the F88SA2 executed through a series of tolerance changes, more stringent gauging, and minor design changes. This experience, both in updating the F88 and F88SA1 to F88SA2 standard, as well as in refining manufacturing processes for the F88SA2 2010 series, has contributed to Thales Australia’s capability to produce a new assault rifle which significantly exceeds Defence’s stated requirements.

The differences between the EF88 and its predecessors are immediately noticeable. The redesigned buttstock and additional MIL-STD-1913 (Picatinny) accessory rails are the most obvious changes. The stock has been redesigned with ergonomics in mind, with a raised portion allowing for better cheek weld when firing. The redesign of the trigger guard allows for the integration of a new, purpose-designed GLA (see information below). The buttplate is now made from a different polymer, ribbed to provide a positive grip on the shoulder, the folding foregrip is gone, the top accessory rail has been lengthened, and additional rails have been added to the underside and right-hand side of the weapon to accommodate the many ancillary devices currently in use. The additional rail added to the right hand side of the weapon, as well as the cocking guide on the left, are made from a high-strength polymer, further lightening the rifle. The receiver has been modified to reduce mass, which not only lightens the weapon (an EF88 with a 20” barrel is over half a kilo lighter than the current-issue F88SA2), but shifts the centre of gravity rearward, closer to the pistol grip. The net effect is a weapon that is not only lighter, but feels significantly more balanced and is easier to manipulate.

Top: EF88 with 16” barrel shown with Ase Utra suppressor, Trijicon TA44SR-10 1.5×16 ACOG, and folding foregrip. Centre: EF88 with 20” barrel, fitted with Trijicon 4×32 BAC ACOG, Madritsch ML40AUS grenade launcher, and Thales Australia-designed quadrant sight with mounted Trijicon RMR. Bottom: F88SA2 (current Australian Defence Force service rifle) with RM Equipment M203PI grenade launcher, Knight’s Armament Company quadrant sight, and standard 1.5x ring sight.

The barrel of the EF88 is produced in Lithgow on Thales’ cold hammer forging machine – the only one in the Southern Hemisphere – and has been fluted to reduce mass, increase rigidity, and allow for better heat dispersion. The EF88’s barrel is now fixed, and no longer needs to be removed whilst inspecting a weapon, as was the case with earlier F88 models. Thales will demonstrate the EF88 to Defence in both a 16” and 20” barrel configuration, though Defence will almost certainly select the 20” variant, as outlined in their specifications. The modified gas plug can now be adjusted by using a fired 5.56×45 cartridge case, and the cocking handle now folds upwards when desired. The hammer pack has been modified to prevent rifle stoppages as a result of firing the GLA, and the ejection port has been extended by 4mm, reducing the number of FTEs (Failures To Extract) caused by trapped fired cases experienced by the operator. The ejection port covers have also been redesigned, making them less vulnerable to damage when fitting and removing, and less likely to work loose after prolonged firing. The two-stage progressive trigger has been retained, requiring a 2.5kg pull for semiautomatic, and 5.0kg for automatic fire. The ADF version will still be fitted with an ALO (Automatic Lock Out) feature seen on previous models, which can be engaged to prevent automatic fire. The EF88 is interoperable with all ammunition types manufactured in accordance with NATO specifications. Testing was conducted with F1, F1A1, M855, SS109, M856, and F3A1 cartridges, with the weapon performing satisfactorily with all cartridges tested. The F1A1 cartridge has an optimised projectile (modified boat tail length and meplat diameter), a redesigned cartridge case, and utilises Thales’ new AR2210V01 propellant.

Comparison of F88SA2 (left) and EF88 (right) butt plates. 

A new GLA (Grenade Launcher Assembly) has been designed, in consultation with Thales Australia, specifically for the EF88. The Madritsch Weapon Technology ML40AUS is manufactured from a lightweight combination of steel, aluminium, and synthetic materials, making it is one of the lightest underbarrel grenade launchers on the market at less than one kilo. An EF88 with a 20” barrel and ML40AUS GLA is more than 1.6kg lighter than the equivalent F88SA2 with current-issue RM Equipment M203PI GLA. The GLA is also integrated with the EF88, mounting directly to the bottom accessory rail. A removable plug conceals an opening which allows the launcher’s trigger to sit within the trigger guard of the rifle itself. This results in the weight of the launcher sitting further from the muzzle, and much closer to the rifle’s point of balance, significantly improving the handling characteristics of the system. The ML40AUS is different from the current-issue M203PI GLA in a number of other ways. It features a side-opening breech, compatible with longer 40x46mm cartridges including less-lethal and illumination rounds, as well as a cross-bolt safety, very similar to that on the EF88 itself, which should help with cross-platform familiarity and training. The ML40AUS has more recently been the subject of some engineering concerns, however these are expected to have been resolved by now. Thales Australia has also designed a new quadrant sight to complement the GLA. Unlike the Knight’s Armament Company quadrant sight assembly currently in use, Thales’ new design mounts to the top accessory rail, and sits neatly alongside optics such as the Trijicon ACOG series.

Comparison of ML40AUS (top) and M203PI (bottom) grenade launchers. Note significantly better point of balance with new GLA, and unwieldy position of quadrant sight on old GLA.

All of this sounded good in practice, however we were eager take the EF88 to the range and put it through its paces. Thales provided the three of us shooting with over two thousand rounds of F1A1 ball, and around twenty 40x46mm cartridges (a mix of Rheinmetall practice marker rounds and M1006 less-lethal ‘sponge’ rounds). Thales’ 600m range is located adjacent to their Lithgow production facility, bordered by steep earth and stone embankments, and set back into the eucalypt forest. We were in for a crisp, cool day with a slight shifting wind that dropped off later in the afternoon. Thales provided us with two EF88 rifles, featuring 16” and 20” barrels, as well as a current-issue F88SA2 for comparison. The 20” EF88 was fitted with the ML40AUS GLA & Thales’ new quadrant sight, a 4x ACOG, and (later) a Harris bipod. The 16” version was presented with a 1.5x ACOG, rail-mounted folding foregrip, and a four-prong threaded flash hider. This was used in conjunction with an Ase Utra suppressor, and will be available as an option on the F90. The F88SA2 had the current-issue M203PI GLA and Knight’s Armament quadrant sight fitted.

Rob Maylor, a former SASR sniper, firing the 16” barrel EF88 (fitted with Ase Utra suppressor, Trijicon TA44SR-10 1.5×16 ACOG, and folding foregrip).

The superior ergonomics and point of balance were immediately noticeable, with both EF88s being significantly more comfortable to manipulate than their predecessors. The 16” variant was particularly easy to handle, and comfortable to manipulate with one hand. The cheek weld was markedly better than on current-issue weapons, and made accurate shooting at range a lot more practical. We engaged targets at 25, 50, 100, and 600 metres, as well as firing grenades out to 150 metres, and found the rifle and GLA to be comfortable and easy to handle at all of these distances. Some high-speed video of the EF88/ML40AUS combination firing 40×46 cartridges can be seen here. Magazine changes were identical to current practice (users will already know not to ‘slap in’ magazines, as you would for many other rifles), however  Defence has now specified that future EF88s will be fitted as standard with a bolt catch release, which should speed up magazine changes. This feature is also standard on all F90 assault rifles. Despite the EF88’s retention of the two-stage, progressive trigger (with long, reasonably heavy trigger pull), we managed to produce surprisingly good results out to 600 metres. Some video of our range time has been posted previously on this site.

Paul Williams test firing the ML40AUS grenade launcher mounted on a 20” barrel EF88. Note convenient, level placement of quadrant sight and mounted Trijicon RMR to left of ACOG. 

Whilst the weapon was comfortable, accurate, and generally reliable, it is worth noting that we experienced two light strikes over the day’s firing. Both of these occurred when firing the oppressed 16” EF88. Thales have informed me that “firing with the suppressor was exploratory at that time; optimisation will be conducted early next year”. Despite these failures, the EF88 has been assessed to have a MRBS (Mean Rounds Between Stoppages) rate and MRBF (Mean Rounds Between Failure) rate that are both very impressive. Unfortunately this data cannot be published just yet, but the numbers show it to be a very reliable rifle.

It was clear that the EF88 is significantly better than its predecessors, and exhibits all of the traits of a competitive modern assault rifle. Within its niche as an advanced bullpup rifle it has little competition – perhaps only from the IMI Tavor series – and exceeds the standards provided by Defence under Land 125. Thales Australia have managed to correct some of the weaknesses of the F88SA2 (poor cheek weld, excessive weight, etc.) with the EF88, and have taken further steps with the F90, with the addition of a bolt catch release, optional compatibility with NATO (AR-15 style) magazines, and a flash hider which is threaded to accept a suppressor. The ML40AUS GLA performed admirably; both it and the Thales-designed quadrant sight were a substantial improvement over the current-issue kit, with the trigger integration and superior system balance of particular note. Thales Australia have built on their experience conducting the  Factory Thorough Rebuild (FTR) program upgrading F88 and F88SA1 rifles to F88SA2 standard, and have clearly transitioned to a true OEM capability. The Enhanced F88 Assault Rifle is the culmination of this process, and comes in the 100^th year of arms manufacturing in Lithgow. With rifles like this, there may well be another hundred ahead.

EF88 with 16” barrel broken down into major component groups. Note hammer pack and retaining pin/rear sling swivel at centre. Ase Utra suppressor and ML40AUS grenade launcher also shown. 

Some updated information on the EF88 has since been made available. Most has been incorporated above.

Improvements/Changes

Improved buttstock design and cheek weld
Reshaped trigger guard to incorporate GLA integration
Enhanced and expanded NATO/Picatinny rails
Modified receiver to reduce mass, and shift centre of gravity rearward
Reduced barrel mass with fluting
Addition of a bolt catch release
Modified gas plug so that adjustments can be made with a spent 5.56 case
Cocking handle now folds into recess as desired
Extended ejection port by 4mm, and improved port covers
Modified hammer to prevent rifle stoppages on GLA firing
Refined buttplate
Ensured interoperability with a range of 5.56×45 ammunition
Technical specifications

EF88 with 20” barrel (F90M)
Weight: 3.39kg
Barrel length: 508mm
Overall length: 802mm

EF88 with 16” barrel (F90)
Weight: 3.25kg
Barrel length: 407mm
Overall length: 700mm

The author would like to thank Thales Australia for their hospitality and support in producing this review. Thanks should be extended, in particular, to Julian Elliott, Graham Evenden, and Richard Basladynski. Cheers also to Rob Maylor and Paul Williams for agreeing to feature in a few of my photos. All photos copyright the author. 

 It should be noted that Thales paid for the accommodation and meals of the author during the review period. The views in this article are those of the author only, and do not necessarily represent those of Thales Australia or the Australian Department of Defence.

A 9M79-1 missile being fired in Kazakhstan during exercise Combat Commonwealth 2011. Credit: Grigoriy Bedenko.

The 9K79 Tochka (Точка; ‘point’) tactical ballistic missile launcher has been identified in a recent video from Syria, seen below. Whilst the YouTube video misidentifies the system as a ‘Scud’, it is almost certainly a 9K79, also referred to as the OTR-21 (OTR: оперативно-тактический ракетный комплекс, or ‘Tactical-operational Missile Complex’), or by its NATO reporting name, the SS-21 Scarab. This Soviet-produced system has a maximum range of 70km, and a Circular Error Probable (CEP) of approximately 150m. An updated version, the 9K79-1 Tochka-U (Scarab-B), was introduced in the 1980s with a maximum range of 120km and a CEP of approximately 92m. Syria is thought to possess both iterations, having received its first deliveries of the earlier 9K79 (Scarab-A) systems from the USSR in 1983. Syria is suspected of supplying 9K79s to North Korea to be reverse-engineered for use in their domestic missile development program.

Two 9K79 or 9K79-1 tactical ballistic missile systems operating in Syria.

The 9K79/9K79-1 is a mobile missile launch system, consisting of the 9M79 solid-fuel missile and the 9P129 6×6 wheeled Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL). Various payloads can be delivered by the 9M79 missile, including HE-frag warheads, submunitions, and nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. A passive radar-homing HE warhead also exists. Syria is known to possess 9M79F (9M79-1F, for the 9K79-1) missiles with 9N123F 120kg HE-fragmentation warheads, and may also possess 9M79K (9M79-1K, for the 9K79-1) missiles, featuring the 9N123K cargo warhead containing 50 9N24 fragmentation submunitions. It is also possible that Syria has purchased or developed delivery systems for chemical or biological weapons.

Diagrams of the 9N123F and 9N123K warheads described above.

The 9P129 (or one of several later variations) TEL vehicle is based on the Object (объект) 5921 6×6 wheeled vehicle, which also serves as a base for the 9A33 TEL for the 9K33 Osa surface-to-air missile system (NATO reporting name: SA-8 Gecko). The 9P129 has a road speed of approximately 60km/h, is fully amphibious, air-transportable, and provided with NBC protection. A trained crew can setup and ready a missile for launch in around 15-20 minutes from a previously mobile position.  9K79-1 systems were used by Russian forces in the both Chechen Wars and in the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict.

9K79-1 Tochka-U systems on parade in Yekaterinburg, Russia. Credit: Фальшивомонетчик (Wikimedia).

The presence of these systems is an interesting development; they are certainly a lot more accurate than the 9K52 Luna-M (FROG-7) rockets and R-17/R-17M (Scud-B/Scud-C) missiles which Syria also possesses. Please note that many media outlets are incorrectly reporting any large rocket or missile as a ‘Scud’. This confusion is partly due to US government-issued statements referring to ‘Scud-type’ missiles. All systems should be positively identified before being referred to as ‘Scuds’, and it should be noted that there are significant differences between the different missiles collectively referred to as ‘Scuds’. Should any readers see further evidence of 9K79/9K79-1 use in Syria, please contact me.

Remember, all unexploded munitions are dangerous. You can visit RRMA for more information. As always, if you see any UXO, remember the ‘ARMS’ acronym:

•AVOID the area

•RECORD all relevant information from a safe distance

•MARK the area to warn others

•SEEK assistance from the relevant authorities

My thanks to Yuri Lyamin, Alex Diehl, and Ivan Kochin for their assistance with this piece. 

I think a bit of context needs to be given to the ABC’s report, ‘Indonesian President vows to outgun Australia‘. Published the same day our new Defence White Paper (PDF) was released, the story’s headline made Indonesia look particularly hawkish. I’d like to offer my thoughts to clear up what Indonesia’s military modernisation is and isn’t about.

First, let’s look at the expanded version of what President SBY actually said (apologies for any errors in translation):

The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is non-negotiable. Our military forces must be larger and more modern than neighbouring countries, like Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, and so on. Given our vast country, the Indonesian military forces must absolutely be larger.

This isn’t about Australia. Not only did SBY not single out Australia, his statements were about reassurance, not threat. What he said makes more sense when you consider SBY, a former general, was speaking at Latihan Gabungan 2013 (a joint military exercise involving 16,000 troops) in front of a large military crowd and, in the lead up to the 2014 presidential election, he was reaching out to a domestic audience.

Looking at its strategic circumstances, it also makes sense for Indonesia to have a bigger military. It’s a vast archipelago with different strategic priorities, the most pressing of which are sovereignty and territorial integrity, and it’s in dire need to boost air and naval capabilities.

Paragraphs 3.16 and 3.17 of the new Defence White Paper indicate that a cohesive and stable Indonesia is vital to our security. For one, we don’t want hostile actors to project power against us from Southeast Asia therefore, as Indonesia grows stronger and more capable militarily, there will be security dividends for the region.

In any case, Indonesia’s military modernisation still has a long way to go as it progresses from a lower capability level and is building up indigenous technological expertise required for high-end capabilities. Furthermore, the history of military involvement in politics still has implications today for the levels of professionalism and conduct within the forces. Indonesia’s military has reformed to an extent, but there’s still the question of transforming into an effective defence organisation (PDF).

The bottom line is Indonesia is busy sorting out its own house. These kinds of statements might be an editorial whim, but they belong to a broader context. So before we get anxious about who’s got the bigger military, let’s remember that it’s not always about us.

Image credit: President of the Republic of Indonesia

How do Indonesia’s police do crowd control? ‘Gangnam Style’, of course. With May Day bringing thousands of demonstrators to Indonesia’s streets protesting for better workers’ rights, Indonesian policewomen in Surabaya danced to the hit song by Psy to keep crowds happy. Well played, POLRI PR, well played.

Video here.

Image credit: Agence France-Press via Jakarta Globe

Brad Nelson has a neat overview in today’s Jakarta Globe of Indonesia’s strategic options vis-à-vis China and the US. Enabled by what he calls ‘strategic flexibility’ (which I think is actually an extension of Indonesia’s so-called ‘dynamic equilibrium’ approach), Indonesia can stay neutral, pick China or the US, be a mediator/conduit or play the big kids off against one another.

Nelson rightly identifies Indonesia as attempting to pursue a ‘conduit’-type role. In fact, to be an effective conduit and exert real influence on the US and China, Nelson prescribes Indonesia build goodwill as a conflict mediator and regional problem-solver.

In theory, it’s a sensible option but I have my misgivings about how it’s presented in relatively unproblematic terms. I say this because I’m reminded of comments made at a recent workshop by a participant challenging Indonesia’s image as a neutral party in South China Sea disputes. They asked, how could Indonesia be a legitimate mediator if it refuses mediation itself on issues such as the Natuna Islands?

Not being an expert on Indonesia’s territorial disputes, I dug up some of I Made Andi Arsana’s writing to work out how much of an issue Natuna is. Arsana’s overview of the history around the Natuna Island EEZ reveals a complicated picture (excerpt):

On the other hand, China seems to have a different view. In 2010, for example, Chinese fishermen were caught fishing in waters off the Natuna Islands, which Indonesia unilaterally considers as part of its EEZ. When patrolling Indonesian officers approached to arrest the vessels, a large Chinese vessel arrived and demanded that the vessels be released.

This gives the impression that the fishing vessels were guarded by a large vessel known as the “Chinese fishery administration vessel”. It can be inferred that China has extended its maritime claim up to the area that Indonesia believes to be its.

The aforementioned incident implies that Indonesia is not totally free from the SCS conflict.

Nelson approach isn’t incorrect but it requires more detail than its current form to be a true representation of Indonesia’s strategic options. It might be strengthened by addressing questions about China–Indonesia strategic relations, found in other writings of Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto and Greta Nabbs-Keller, to name a few. With reports earlier this year of the Indonesian navy on alert for possible Chinese claims to Natuna waters, it seems like this isn’t over yet.

Here’s my latest post on The Strategist, and kudos to the executive editor for letting me keep the phrase ‘dropping the mic’. 

One of the main features of the Indonesian President’s speech to last week’s Jakarta International Defense Dialogue was the concept of ‘strategic trust’. Admitting this was difficult to define, he referred to it as ‘an evolving sense of mutual confidence between nations – particularly between government and militaries’ that enables parties to work together more effectively and, more importantly, peacefully.

President SBY offered two examples from Indonesia’s own history where strategic trust has been the glue in otherwise shattered relationships: between Indonesia and East Timor (a poignant reference given East Timor’s PM Xanana Gusmão was sitting in the audience), and between the Indonesian government and GAM in Aceh. His message is that it’s something that can bring bitter enemies together very gradually over time, ‘brick by brick’, and it has to reach from top leadership to the bottom rung.

It’s not a particularly radical concept, and it has been bounced around before. But what President SBY has put in words is, for instance, what Australia is seeking to build with regional partners. If we were asking ourselves, ‘what does it take to be strategic partners with Indonesia?’, SBY has got an easy answer: ‘strategic trust’, as it’s understood in Jakarta. And that’s the beauty of abstraction: you’re off the hook proving it in quantitative terms but you certainly can say you’re working towards it.

The President gets further mileage from a term ‘strategic trust’ because it’s entirely consistent with the back catalogue of Indonesia’s regional and international proclamations. Strategic trust is an extension of Indonesia’s foreign policy of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ and its diplomatic approach of having ‘a million friends and zero enemies’. It continues to affirm Indonesia’s desire to be seen as a balancer within the region, not only between global and emerging powers, but also between Asia–Pacific partners. It comes as no surprise that the President would cite opportunities for strategic trust-building as areas where Indonesia has been active diplomatically: in Myanmar’s democratic transition and the South China Sea Code of Conduct.

The speech might not be ground-breaking but it’s clever for slipping a diplomatic buzzword into a forum like JIDD. There’s no doubt ‘strategic trust’ was whispered around the JIDD stalls throughout the day and after. Media coverage of the event has played up SBY’s speech like he was ‘dropping the mic’ on strategic thinking. But at the end of the day, ‘strategic trust’ is a term that, if incorporated into our everyday diplomatic parlance and practice with Indonesia, wouldn’t be a bad thing.

Image source: President of the Republic of Indonesia. 

If you’re looking for an Indonesian perspective on the US pivot, check out Dewi Fortuna Anwar’s NBR and Asialink essays. Her NBR essay, in particular, sees the pivot as reversing the perception that the US neglected Southeast Asia during the Bush years. According to DFA, it was a time when ASEAN and other Asia-Pacific partners could develop new relations between themselves to manage China’s rise. But since then, as China has swung its weight around in unfavourable ways, the region (including Indonesia) is glad the US is ‘back’, so to speak.

In terms of the pivot’s substance, DFA notes Indonesia’s concern that too much emphasis on the military dimension risks stoking regional tension (something that Ashton Carter addressed in his Jakarta International Defense Dialogue speech this week). DFA explains that the Marines in Darwin are close enough to the US-owned Freeport mining operations in Papua to raise suspicions of intervention. She concedes this is highly unlikely but cites past US and Australian interference across the archipelago as the historical background for this fear.

These messages are reiterations of Indonesia’s foreign policy and strategic positions, particularly with regards to hedging great powers and promoting regional cooperation. The utility of DFA’s essays therefore is to provide Australian and American audiences with an account of Indonesia’s official perspective (she’s still, after all,  Deputy Secretary for Political Affairs to the Vice President). As time goes by, and proposals like the HADR exercise between Australian-Indonesian-American forces come to fruition, there’ll be a greater indication of how the pivot has played out for Indonesia, but until then, watch this space.

By N.R. Jenzen-Jones

RAF Regiment gunners, aboard a RAF C-17ER, in front of a French VAB SAN (armoured ambulance variant). Credit: AFP.

Royal Air Force (RAF) Regiment troops, possibly based out of Honington or Wittering, have been deployed to Bamako as a force protection (FP) element for RAF operations in support of the French intervention in Mali. France’s Opération Serval is being supported by two RAF C-17ER transport planes, operated by No. 99 Squadron from RAF Brize Norton. These aircraft are to ferry French armoured vehicles from the Évreux-Fauville Air Base in France, to Bamako.

Whilst the British government has claimed there will be ‘no UK boots on the ground’, that is not strictly true. In this video, RAF Regiment FP elements can be seen at Bamako Airport with a range of field kit, small arms, and other equipment. The RAF tactical recognition flash and RAF Regiment ‘mudguard’ badges can be clearly seen (see examples below). French VAB (Véhicule de l’Avant Blindé) series armoured personnel carriers are unloaded from the C-17ER. RAF regiment gunners fought alongside US Marines during the insurgent attack on Camp Bastion in Afghanistan, last September. The attack left two US Marines of Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMA-211) dead, 6 AV-8B Harrier II ground attack aircraft destroyed, and two more damaged. Members of No. 5 RAF Regiment Force Protection Wing and elements 2/10 Battalion US Marines then fought to regain control of the airfield, capturing one insurgent, and killing fourteen others.

The deployment of limited FP assets as seen in Bamako is standard procedure, and certainly does not constitute a British commitment to combat operations in Mali. Nevertheless, the British government has been less than transparent about these measures. In a 14 January sitting of the House of Commons, Bob Stewart (Conservative Member for Beckenham) asked:

“The House totally understands that no combat troops will be deployed, yet technical personnel will be sent to Bamako airfield to service the large aircraft that will presumably bring in equipment such as tanks. When those aircraft land, will those technical personnel include force protection personnel, possibly including personnel from the RAF Regiment, who are actually soldiers?”

Mark Simmonds, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, responded:

“I thank my hon. Friend for his question. The capital of Mali is pronounced “Bam-ack-co”. Just to clarify the matter, there are currently no plans for NATO to be involved in Mali. The EU has drawn up a mission comprising 400 men, about 250 of whom will be force protection, and they are due to deploy later in the year. My hon. Friend asked a specific question about the number of military personnel who will be there to operate and to defend, if necessary, the aircraft when they are in Bamako. I will have to let him know about that.”

It seems strange that the British government would not be as open and transparent as possible with regards to the FP measures being undertaken to secure RAF assets in Mali. One would think the British public would be reassured to know that the appropriate security elements are in place, whether that technically means combat troops on the ground, or not.

My thanks to Aris Roussinos for his assistance with this piece.
RAF Regiment recognition flash (credit: Wikimedia) and ‘mudguard’ (credit).
RAF Regiment gunners landing in Bamako. Credit: ITN Source.

I’ve just returned from a trip to Jakarta so with Indonesia on my mind, it’s a good time to share some of the recent Indonesia-related posts I’ve written on The Strategist, starting with Australia’s stated defence policy on Indonesia:

26 September, Canberra:

Australia’s leaders from both sides of politics have been paying greater attention to Indonesia; there’s been more official engagement, as well as new diplomatic and defence initiatives in the past year. And we’ve been describing Indonesia, as our Defence Minister has during his Jakarta visit last week, in more important terms like ‘strategic partner’.

But it looks like that there’s some way to go before ‘strategic partner’ becomes more than just a term of endearment. If we look at the 2009 Defence White Paper (for the time being still the government’s defence strategic policy), we find a curious ambivalence towards Indonesia. According to the White Paper, we have a ‘fundamental interest in controlling the air and sea approaches to our continent’ (paragraph 5.5). But in reference to a secure immediate neighbourhood, it says we should prevent or mitigate ‘nearby states [from] develop[ing] the capacity to undertake sustained military operations within our approaches’ (paragraph 5.8). There’s a contradiction there; as Hugh White notes in his Security Challenges essay (PDF), it may very well be those same capabilities Indonesia requires to ensure its own security in its northern approaches that could be instrumental in both Indonesia and Australia securing their strategic interests.

In short, the language of the 2009 Defence White Paper simply doesn’t match our statements of Indonesia as a strategic partner. And although there are asymmetries in our capabilities, a strategic partnership means allowing and encouraging Indonesia to grow in a way that complements our strengths and compensates for our weaknesses so that we can work together; if Indonesia is to play an important role in our strategic future, then actively mitigating or preventing particular capacities isn’t the way to go.

This position might have been justifiable in white papers released after Konfrontasi (during which Australia and Indonesia found themselves on opposing sides of the conflict) or shortly after the 1999 East Timor intervention, during which relations with Indonesia were more fractious and the military (TNI) was only just exiting Indonesian politics. But times have changed.

On the domestic front, Indonesia is a much more stable, democratic state. In economic terms Indonesia is now starting to flex its muscle. Its GDP grew by an annualised 6.4% in the second quarter of 2012, its economy is now larger than Australia’s in purchasing power parity terms, and its middle class is larger than Australia’s population. TNI no longer exerts the same level of direct influence on politics and there’s a greater commitment to crack down on corruption. In regional terms, Indonesia enjoys greater clout and has attracted the attention of international partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom and China. Recent participation in RAAF-hosted Exercise Pitch Black 2012 (see image) shows Indonesia’s willingness to engage with partners such as Australia by sending their newest aircraft to build person-to-person ties and to dispel doubt as to their military intentions.

Barring a significant change in Indonesia’s trajectory of growth and domestic transformation, this is likely to become an enduring externality for Australian policy. Nonetheless, it’s worth thinking through the factors that could cause problems for Indonesia down the track: these include slowed growth, a change of leadership to one that is more internally focused, and deteriorating domestic stability. The question is whether these eventualities would adversely affect the Indonesia–Australia relationship in the long term or would merely slow the engagement temporarily. That said, the relationship between Indonesia and Australia seems to be on an unstoppable path of growth. A nationalist President of Indonesia would be a concern but wouldn’t necessarily require a radical rewrite of Indonesia’s place in our strategic interests. In any case, as one RSIS commentator notes (PDF), nationalism at present is not a call for concern.

Likewise, Australia can cause ructions over livestock, people smuggling or the incarcerations of Australians, but the fundamental shared interests should ultimately prevail. In terms of shifting regional geopolitics, Australia and Indonesia might have more in common in the future Asia as we both navigate China’s rise and the US rebalance. A Defence Cooperation Agreement signed recently between Australia and Indonesia provides a framework for practical cooperation on common security matters, but it’s time to work together as well on bigger, long-term strategic questions about the region.

Indonesia demands different handling in the next Defence White Paper, which is as much an opportunity as the Asian Century White Paper to correctly recognise Indonesia’s place. Language matters, because it sends a strong signal to both the Australian and Indonesian people about how we see each country’s place in the region. And while the majority of everyday people in each country may not delve into the pages of the White Paper, setting the tone for political interaction as well as doing away with ambiguous language remains important. Hopefully the 2013 White Paper will articulate Indonesia’s importance and elevate it to partner status rather than a subordinate. That sort of constructive language would remove the disparity between language of the 2009 White Paper and the increasing importance of close defence relations and alignment of strategic interests between the two nations.

The White Paper might start by recognising the complementarity across our capabilities, strengths and weaknesses. Or it could, as Hugh White suggests, create a heading for Indonesia separate from the rest of ‘our neighbourhood’ to recognise the important role it plays in our strategic environment. While there’s no prospect of an alliance between our countries in the foreseeable future, it would provide a more robust basis in our national policy to give a broader context to initiatives such as the recently signed Defence Cooperation Agreement.

Defence Minister Smith assures us that he is ‘committed to regular, open and transparent discussions with Indonesia on the development of Australia’s 2013 Defence White Paper’. Let’s hope the final cut pays them the same due respect.

Image courtesy of Department of Defence.

By N.R. Jenzen-Jones

This post originally appeared at The Rogue Adventurer.

On October 2^nd the armed wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (حركة الجهاد الإسلامي في فلسطين‎), the al-Quds Brigades, took to the streets of Fatah in Southern Gaza to mark the 17^th anniversary of the assassination of Fathi al-Shaqaqi. Shaqaqi was assassinated in Malta by the Mossad in 1995. Each year, the al-Quds Brigades take to the streets for a military parade to mark the event, brandishing a variety of arms and carrying all manner of banners and flags. This year’s parade, however, was a little different, and held some interesting items for those of us following the spread of various small arms. Amongst the usual assortment of Russian AKMs & Eastern Bloc copies, Chinese Type 56 variants, PKMs, and RPG-7 variants and copies were two far less common weapons: the F2000 and AK-103 assault rifles.

The F2000 Standard, as seen here, is manufactured only by FN Herstal of Belgium, whilst the AK-103 is predominantly manufactured by the Russian state-owned Izhevsk Machine-Building Plant (IZHMASH). Neither of these rifles would ordinarily be expected to turn up in Palestine, and certainly not in the hands of a designated terrorist organisation such as PIJ. Where then, might such weapons have come from? The F2000 is in very limited service in Pakistan, and 55,000 rifles were sold to the Saudi Arabian National Guard in 2005. Neither avenue of supply appears likely. The AK-103 is in use in limited numbers in Morocco, and is thought to be in limited service with Iranian Takavaran naval commandos. Whilst PIJ has some pretty strong links to Iran, sending a handful of foreign-purchase weapons in place of locally-produced or previously stockpiled (cheaper) weapons would seem an unusual choice for them to make.

The AK-103 and the F2000 do not typically turn up in the hands of the same fighting force (an exception to this rule may, occasionally, occur in India). There has been one recent conflict however, where precisely this has happened – Libya. These two weapons were used concurrently by both parties to the conflict, in fact. AK-103-2 rifles were found in the hands of pro-Qaddafi (and later rebel) fighters; these were manufactured in Russia and possibly served as precursors to a deal to produce such weapons locally. 367 F2000 Standard assault rifles, meanwhile, were known to have been exported by FN Herstal to Libya in 2009. They were intended for use by the elite 32^nd ‘Khamis’ Brigade, and were later captured by rebel fighters and put to use against regime forces. The F2000 rifles seen in Libya were sold and equipped with FN Herstal underbarrel 40x46mm grenade launchers, known as the LG1. The F2000s pictured in Gaza also sport LG1s.

Much has been written about the threat of arms proliferation in the wake of the collapse of the Qaddafi regime. The UN Security Council has heard from the United Nations Inter-agency Assessment Mission to Sub-Saharan Region that “Governments in the region are faced with… the smuggling of weapons from Libyan stockpiles”. IPS news quoted a former rebel as saying ““All of the militias are involved in selling weapons. There is no law in Libya, still no functioning government, and the country’s security forces are too weak to control the situation, so selling weapons is regarded as legal by many of the rebels”. Whilst much of the international community’s attention has been focused on the threat of Libya’s MAN Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS), small arms such as these assault rifles are responsible for 60-90% of worldwide conflict fatalities each year.

So, have assault rifles from the Libyan conflict ended up in Gaza? The PIJ only appear to possess a few of each rifle, in keeping with a limited proliferation profile expected of weapons deemed prestigious by Libyan rebels. Whilst 7.62×39 and 5.56×45 calibre cartridges (for the AK-103 and F2000 rifles, respectively) are both reasonably common in Gaza, it is worth noting that no 40×46 grenades can be seen accompanying the LG1 grenade launchers in these photos. Both rifles would certainly be of use to PIJ, however tactically they would hold little advantage over any other serviceable assault rifle in the hands of guerrilla fighters. With the comparatively low level of marksmanship training that such militias have, these rifles won’t give them much of an edge. The exception may be the LG1 modules, if ammunition for these is readily available in Gaza. Whilst this is definitely more of a symbolic victory for them – modern assault rifles perhaps giving the appearance of a more effective force – the question of where such arms came from merits further investigation. Of course, without inspecting the weapons in question it is impossible to determine their true origin. We cannot even tell, from these photos, whether these AK-103 rifles are AK-103-2 models or not. Regardless, it is certainly strange that both would appear in images from Gaza at the same time.

Damien Spleeters, Belgian freelance journalist and arms researcher, has an excellent piece (focusing on the F2000) available here. This piece was front-page news in Belgium, and explores how such weapons may have ended up in Gaza, and what the Belgian government can do to assist in tracing such misappropriation of weapons produced in their country. There is further commentary on his blog.

The Group for Research and Information on Peace and security (GRIP) first commented on the F2000’s presence in Gaza.

Thanks to Will McCants for his assistance in adding a little context to the photos. 

The photo was taken from the PIJ al-Quds Brigades website. 

Of the Defence issues raised over the past 12 months, none has been more controversial than the government’s decision to lift a ban on gender discrimination in the military which means women are eligible to serve in close combat units, including special forces.

In Australia, we value the principles equality and fairness and the right of the individual not to be discriminated on the basis of race, religion, age or gender. But there are specific challenges to applying a rights-based approach to the profession of the arms. This is because there are strong historical and cultural legacies surrounding ideas of the military, warfare and masculinity.

Historically, the military and warzones are not imagined and understood as a context for women as soldiers. Australian women appeared in support roles such as nurses, drivers, workers, mothers and later carers of returned soldiers. In this sense, gender reform is not just about enshrining the equal rights for women in the military but must, over time, break down traditional, cultural and historical understandings of warfare, the military and masculinity.

This is challenging because in the military, while the individual is important, the “group” (that is, the military) and survival of the nation and its interests are paramount. Resistance towards women in combat has focussed on an assumption that there will be degradation of physical standards and hence overall force effectiveness. But provided women can meet the physical requirements for the role, there should be no reason this would be problematic.

Yet further objections to women in these units include their being a threat to cohesion. That is, women will be a source of distraction, causing sexual competition between male soldiers and create added liability as male soldiers protect their female counterparts before others. In this way, women are framed as an undesirable inclusion that undermines the profession. This is part of the challenge introducing a rights-based approach in the military as cultural acceptance of equal treatment between men and women must catch up to legal changes.

Some have argued that there’s little point to enshrining equal opportunity in the military. As the argument goes, few women would pass combat corps physical tests so there would be a disproportionate increase in cost. These costs could include upgrading facilities to accommodate both genders, adjusting living quarters in submarines, providing more medical services specific for women’s needs, and developing new body armour, amongst other requirements. In Canada, despite having combat arms open to women since 1989, combat troops count only 3.8 per cent among its ranks (some put the figure of women in combat roles as low as two per cent). And while women have been eligible to apply for selection in New Zealand’s elite special forces unit, the Special Air Service, none so far have been successful. It is likely that Australia will also not attract a large proportion of women in close combat roles.

However, this is not just about numbers. Costs are a consideration, but for a society that values and upholds rights, cost inefficiencies are recouped by the broader gains. Promoting fairness and equality in Australian society is an achievement that is less easily measured, but is necessary and valued.

It doesn’t help that some see lifting the ban on women in combat as a purely political measure taken by Defence Ministers. The perception that gender reform was politicised makes wider cultural acceptance of women in the military more challenging. If women are qualified and willing to undertake combat roles, they should also be given every chance to succeed. This means preparing for the implementation of gender reform by acknowledging the practical challenges like cost and infrastructure and proceeding in spite of the political motivations.

Another issue to consider is that, in spite of women’s eligibility for all roles in the military, those in close combat are seen to be valued more than those in non-combat or support roles (this has been reflected, for instance, in patterns of military promotion). And the same applies for men. Part of breaking down ideas of masculinity and soldiering also involves valuing the contribution of men in non-combat roles in the military. This point has often been elided in discussion about gender and the ADF but is important to the debate.

The military has already taken some steps towards implementing gender reform. All jobs in the military will be based on merit with all candidates required to pass gender-neutral physical tests. These tests are based on corps-specific tasks so Infantry candidates must complete a casualty drag simulating a combat situation whereas Combat Engineer candidates must lift heavier weights simulating the equipment used (the author received this information during a September visit to a Reserves unit). In the past, there were different physical standards for men and women in an attempt to recognise the physiological differences between the genders and increase the recruitment of women. This will be instrumental in breaking down ideas about women as weak and vulnerable but time is also needed to normalise and further legitimate the idea of women working alongside men in close combat roles.

Overall, Australia is a fair and progressive country and we should continue to push forward for gender equality. It will take the will and hard work of select groups of women in close combat roles, and the assistance of the ADF and the community, to mitigate (but not eliminate) the perceived risks of promoting women’s rights in this field.

With Australian, Canadian, British, American, New Zealand, Danish, Norwegian and Dutch forces in combat roles in conflicts including Afghanistan and Iraq, women have been on the ‘’frontline” and have found themselves inadvertently in close combat circumstances. There is no shortage of data and information to collect from both male and female operators about their experiences that can be used, in supplement to principles of equality and fairness, to shape our policymaking in pragmatic ways.

The elimination of gender discrimination will go some way in reforming parts of Defence culture. And ultimately, one day the idea of the soldier will resoundingly also include women.

Natalie Sambhi is an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) and editor of ASPI’s blog, The Strategist. The views expressed here are her own.

This article was first published by the online human rights magazine Right Now as part of their September focus on women’s rights and is available here. Image courtesy of Flickr user US Army.

An Indonesian Navy (Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut; TNI-AL) boarding party with Captain Mal Wise, Australian Commander Task Group after a simulated boarding exercise conducted on HMAS Perth (FFH 157), during Exercise KAKADU 2012. Interesting to note the integration of Indonesian Naval SOF, KOPASKA (Komando Pasukan Katak; Frogman Commando Team), operators with a regular Navy boarding party. Australian boarding parties often operate in a similar way, with members of a Clearance Diving Team attached.

KOPASKA was influenced by USN Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs) and US Navy SEALs, and has roughly similar operational responsibilities, including maritime counter-terrorism. Their insignia features a winged frog and anchor device, and their motto is “Tan Hana Wighna Tan Sirna” (“there is no obstacle that cannot be overcome”).

Defence notes: “Exercise Kakadu 2012 is Australia’s largest maritime exercise and allows the RAN to develop operational capability and skills in a coalition environment. Exercise Kakadu will be conducted from 29 August to 14 September in the Northern Australian Exercise Area off the coast of Darwin.  In 2012 there will be 15 ships, and over 2000 sailors and officers from 17 participating and observing nations taking part”

Photo credits: Department of Defence