nosex:
andrewfmorrison:
I’m deterritorializing the subaltern! I’m intersubjectivizing their supranational anti-hegemonic potentialities! I have no idea what any of these terms really mean, and I can’t possibly clarify them!
ha, i can’t do this right now! i am currently having an argument on this very matter: me trying to defend postmodernism. this actually prompted me to post the foucault-chomsky debate because i really think that there is a value & a purpose in postmodern thought, even if that value makes more ambiguous an already complex world. i think foucault is unique in the sense that he is an exceptionally coherent postmodern thinker, & i think it’s important to recognize that not all postmodern writing is exceptionally obfuscated. but, also, i want to make a case for difficult writing: it is a poetic, artistic appreciation. as much as postmodernist thinkers want to propose theory, they also want to encompass a feeling & an anxiety within their writing itself (a sort of confirmation of content in form). being a huge fan of barthes, for me the complexity of some writing serves to increase the “plurality” of the text, allowing for a freer association, a more radical approach to meaning & interpretation. language is a difficult thing, & centralized meaning often mistakes human experience. this is to say, the modern thinkers & the continental tradition are both full of certainty in ontological & metaphysical problems, but that certainty, i feel, is antithetical to the human condition: full of anxiety, confusion, conflict, and paradox. deconstruction solves a lot of problems, i feel, against an institutionalized intuition (a feeling designed by our society). knowledge & ignorance are not as distinct as we academically permit, human & animal, free & determined, abesnt & present, social progress & reversion. it’s not that postmodernism has abandoned meaning, it is that it argues for a radical reinterpretation of the function & origins of meaning. this allows for a reexamination, a reevaluation of central problems which have continued to go unsolved or unsatisfactorily explored. we can begin to find answers in unexpected places. to me, these sorts of ambiguities & difficulties are exciting & are, in the very least, worth study.
not to mention, making up words is a lot of fun.
From my understanding of continental works, it seems intuitively that there is nothing necessary about the verbosity of its writing- the issues covered could easily be expressed in less lofty language, even if we allow for the possibility of multiple interpretations.
The greatest strength and weakness of analytic philosophy is that it strives towards modesty in its claims. It leaves the masterful, elevated prose to literature (a domain of human creativity which suits those considerations much better, in my opinion), and the conclusions about the human condition to the aforementioned literature, art, music, et cetera.
Good philosophy, in my opinion, works between the various domains of human knowledge rather than above them. This is why you’ll find very few in the analytic tradition that identify themselves as a philosopher singularly; most will say they work in the domain of aesthetics, or the philosophy of science, or epistemology, or the philosophy of literature, and so on. When done right, philosophy will allow us to refine the methodological approach of other domains of knowledge, become aware of their scope and limitations, and perhaps identify an appropriate context for their conclusions. But it won’t do much on its own to help better or more original work be done in those other domains of knowledge.
I would say the focus on objectivity in analytic philosophy goes back at least to Kant, who identified most clearly in his Critique of Pure Reason the faculty of human reason. I think that continental philosophy makes far too much out of particularity and subjective experience, elevating it practically to the point where it becomes the most important facet of human experience (the worst offender being Lacan’s distinction between reality and the Real that Žižek and his ilk lean on very heavily in their work). Though of course there are limits on human knowledge and perception, the continental philosophers allow an awareness of these limitations to pervade their thought to the exclusion of other considerations.
Continental philosophy seems also to have an almost exclusively anti-authoritarian, left-leaning bent to it (which I have no complaints about; it’s probably why I’m drawn to it to begin with). However, its desire to subvert the existing structures of power in society is frustrated by its own approach- by using such complicated and technical writing it practically condemns itself to irrelevance for the vast majority of society.
Nonetheless, there is some common ground here. Good philosophy in the analytic tradition will allow for a “radical reinterpretation of the function and origins of meaning,” with the example springing to mind most readily being W.V.O. Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” one of the most celebrated papers in the history of analytic philosophy. Philosophers of language continue to ask the question “what is meaning?”- the debate is far from settled. They study some of the ambiguities you speak of. We see continued debates on these subjects in all domains of analytic philosophy, a consequence, in part, of the move away from logical positivism in the second half of the 20th century. These debates, however, are not grounded in subjectivity or experience- and that is what makes them interesting, in my opinion. If we take subjectivity to be the point of departure for philosophy, then we at least partially prevent it from having an independent public meaning.
I very much admire the continental philosophers’ awareness of social context, but I still think meaningful truths are possible independent of such social context. I realize that part of the particular approach of continental philosophy stems out of an awareness that for centuries (and even still today, though to a lesser extent) “objective” meant “rich white male’s perspective,” but I think they took that awareness in the wrong direction. Instead of working to minimize this bias in perspective (a worthy goal for anyone in pursuit of objectivity), and reclaim notions of objectivity for everyone (instead of defining it in privileged terms, thus truly making it objective), they claim that objectivity is largely a myth, an unattainable goal. This has almost turned philosophy into a game of competing ideologies, with rhetoric getting in the way of truth that philosophy should strive for.